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LIEUT.-GENERAL SIMCOE understanding that the translation of the *Duke de Liancourt's Travels* has been much circulated, thinks it not improper to print an extract from a letter of his to the printer, Mr. Phillips, in answer to a very civil communication received from him respecting that work. This extract will elucidate the purport of the communication, and at the same time account for Lieut.-General Simcoe's speech, on the closing of the first parliament of the province of Upper Canada, being inserted in the appendix of that work.

He adds a paper delivered by him, when he was very lately under orders for foreign service, to the Honorable Rufus King, minister from the United States.

LIBRARY - GENERAL SIMCOE

that the translation of the *Journal de l'Amirauté* I would have been very
glad, thinks it not improper to print an extract from a letter of his to the
printer, Mr. Phillips, in answer to a very civil communication received
from him respecting that work. The extract will shew the nature of
the communication, and at the same time shew the nature of the
General's reply, on the subject of the publication of the *Journal de l'Amirauté*
Canada, being referred to the appendix of this work.

It was a paper delivered to him, which he has very much
for private friends, to the Honorable Robert Bland, on the 10th
of June.

EXTRACT.

WOLFORD-LODGE; June 25th, 1799.

I FEEL myself highly obliged by your letter of the 19th of June, and the more so, as the press, since the commencement of the American war, has fashioned itself to the views and interests of those who have endeavoured to destroy the constitution of England.

In respect to the subject of your letter, I do not see how it would be practicable to alter, in the translation, what the Duke de Liancourt has printed in his native language. The sheets before me, are, I think, uniformly mistatements, and those on points (such as the Canada constitution) where he had the subject matter in print. I presume these errors not to be wilful. In respect to any part of my public conduct, that will be always ready to meet discussion, where *such discussion* is useful to the public; but, I trust, our American enmity has ceased, and I *know*, that under God, I am the instrument that prevented the war between the two countries.

If the Duke de Liancourt, on his return to Philadelphia, told the Americans, that should a war commence, I said, "it must be a war of the purse," and that instead of their attacking Niagara, "I meant to attack Philadelphia," his visit (and also that of many others) was of great temporary utility to the King's service. But where he could pick up the story of there being *fifty thousand* Indians (which no American could believe) or that they had all taken *oaths* to *roast* and scalp the Americans, which many Americans would swallow, I am at a loss to conceive.

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On the whole, let his book take its course in the world: if necessary, I shall contradict it; if otherwise, still in process of time my posthumous memoirs may appear, and a niche may be reserved for this very ungenerous Frenchman.

In the 240th page the Duke mentions my *boasting*: I detest the word, and trust it has never infected my conduct. I wish it could be altered to "speaking," or any other word. The fact is not true: I *never* burnt a house during the whole war, except founderies, gaols, and magazines; and in the Memoirs of the Queen's Rangers, a few copies of which I published, in one view to contradict such characters as La Fayette and Chastellux, I expressly remarked, page 20, "On the return, and "about two miles from Haddonfield, Major Simcoe was observing to "some officers a peculiar strong ground, when looking back, he saw a "house, that he had passed, in flames: it was too far gone for all his endeavours to save it; he was exceedingly hurt at the circumstance, but "neither threats of punishment, nor offers of reward, could induce a discovery. This was the only instance of a disorder of this nature that "ever happened under his command; and he afterwards knew it was "not perpetrated by any of the Queen's Rangers." So that you see, Sir, my proud *boasting* is of a different quality from what Monsieur Liancourt has apprehended: but most certainly, if American *avarice*, *envy*, or *folly*, had attempted to overrun Upper Canada, I should have defended myself by such measures as English Generals had been accustomed to, and not fought for the morality of war, in the suspicious data of the insidious economist: my humanity, I trust, is founded on the religion of my country, and not on the hypocritical professions of a puny philosophy.

That the Duke de Liancourt asserts my *defensive* plans were settled, and that I loudly professed my hatred to the United States, I conceive with the *candid reader*, will make all those shafts fall harmless, which, through me, *he* aims, as an *honest Frenchman*, at my country and its best interest, namely, an irrevocable union with the United States. Those
sentiments

sentiments of mine were called forth into public, by the improper conduct of Mr. Randolph, the American secretary of state, in 1794, and are printed in Debret's Collection. I know they gave great satisfaction to the English Americans, and as much umbrage to the philosophists and Frenchmen.

I will trouble you for a moment to say, that if you publish any papers as an appendix to your translation, you may not think it improper to include the speech I inclose, which has never been printed in England, and is illustrative of the objects I had in view, and may, by a note of reference, be easily connected with the view of them, as exhibited by Mons. Liancourt.

His descriptions, it may be easily traced, originated from snatches and pieces of my conversation.

Should this speech not enter into your plan, I will be obliged to you to return it to me.

Does the Duke de Liancourt mention his companion Petit Thouars? Perhaps your translator may not know that he was captain of the *Tonnant*, and killed in the battle with Lord Nelson; if he does not, the anecdote may be agreeable to him.

I am now to apologize for the trouble I give you in this hasty letter: receive it as a mark of my respect, as I would wish to stand well in the opinion of a man, who, like you, has the wisdom to see that the character of the nation is interested in that of the individual; and that unspotted reputation is the most desirable acquisition for a military and civil servant of his king and country to secure and to enjoy.

I observe the translator says, p. 229, "*York designed to be the seat of government*," &c. It is at *present* the seat of government, but before I left England for America, *I designed* London, on the Thames, or *La Tranche*, as the seat of government, and York as an arsenal. I did not, as Mons. Liancourt seems to suppose, act from circumstances, for I always expected Niagara to be given up, and never thought its possession of importance.

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COPY OF A PAPER

Delivered to the HONORABLE RUFUS KING,

MINISTER OF THE UNITED STATES.

LONDON, *May*, 1800.

The Duke de Liancourt Rochefoucault, in the recent publication of his Travels thro' North-America, speaks with much freedom of Major-General Simcoe, then Lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada. It must evidently appear to any person, who shall give the subject due consideration, that the conclusions which the Duke de Liancourt draws from his supposed communications with the Lieutenant-governor (while living in his family) are at variance, and inconsistent with themselves; yet, as a servant of his king and country, Major-General Simcoe deems it proper to say, that the principles which governed his conduct while in the administration of the government of Upper Canada, were the reverse of what is insinuated by the Duke de Liancourt, and that he was actuated by the most sincere intentions to preserve peace, good neighbourhood, and good will between the king's subjects and those of the United States; and he has ever been of opinion, in express contradiction to Mons. de Liancourt, that the most strict union between the two nations, is the real interest of each, and will mark the soundest policy and true wisdom in those who shall, respectively, govern their councils. Major-General Simcoe is so conscious of having personally acted upon these principles during his administration of that government, that he has claimed from
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the Duke of Portland and Mr. Pitt, protection and consideration, as having been the principal means of preventing hostilities with the United States, from the mode in which he executed the military orders he received in Upper Canada.

In testimony of these premises, Major-General Simcoe begs leave, most respectfully, to offer this representation to the Honourable Rufus King, minister plenipotentiary from the United States to the king of Great Britain.



Lieut.

Lieut.-General SIMCOE adds a letter of his father to the late Lord BARRINGTON. This monument of the elevated views and statesman-like projects of an accomplished officer, will best elucidate the earliest impressions of his son, relative to America, and vindicate the motives of his conduct from any misrepresentation. The Duke de LIANCOURT ROCHEFOUCAULT would therein find what incited the Lieut.-General to prefer the Lieutenant Government of Upper Canada to any other object that might be fairly supposed to be in his reach.—The events of the American war have not annihilated the essential interests of Great Britain and the United States.

LETTER to Lord BARRINGTON.

" Si barbarorum est, in diem vivere, nostra consilia semperiternum tempus spectare debent."

Tull. Cicero.

MY LORD,

I will not offer to apologize for the trouble given you in reading this paper, because I have experience that any sketch presented to your Lordship for the public service, will meet with a favorable reception: in the subsequent observations therefore, if the principles should be erroneous, or the means ill-proportioned, your Lordship, I trust, will pardon the mistakes, because the end is just. It appears to me, my Lord, that the French government has, until lately, given but an imperfect attention to their North American settlements, and whilst it has projected claims to the universal, by a parsimonious conduct, has neglected to establish, solidly, a partial dominion there. But French genius and industry has tempered these errors, the discoveries and representations of their missionaries have opened their ears; the lucrative fishery and reduction of Louisbourg have opened their eyes. This capture is, or might have been, of the same service to them, as the late rebellion in
Scotland

Scotland was to this nation : past errors were seen, favorable occasions given to correct abuses, and to prevent future evils. When the disparity of numbers in North America is considered, the French about fifty thousand, the English near two millions, we are surprized that a Frenchman there dares open his mouth unless with obeisance, but when he lifts his hand and strikes, from Carolina to Nova Scotia, it seems portentous. Numbers, however, avail not without counsel and valour; the astonishment ceases on a nearer survey, and we easily discern the balance more than restored by the difference of genius, manners, pursuits, situation, and government of these people. The English are of a commercial, the French of a military disposition; the latter enterprising, restless, subtle, active, and ambitious; the former sedentary, softened, fond of quiet and lucre: the force of one strengthened by the union and harmony of its parts, animated and directed to an invariable point by one government; that of the other broken and dissipated by a variety of distinct governments, habits, views, and humours: the English negligent and unskilful in applying to the passions of the Indians, and in anglicising them; the French of ready address, and incessant application in their management, the more dangerous and difficult to guard against, as the young are tutored, and the sanguinary disposition of the old flattered into horrid acts of treachery and massacre, as pleasing to the deity and becoming manhood. Hence we see the French insulting every where with an evident superiority; the English every where invaded, defenceless, impotent even to the perception and contempt of the Indians. Whoever remembers the American brigade in the West Indies, will readily discern the mistake of those who judge the American English fitted for military purposes, without the exercise of some painful campaigns; and, if they took Louisbourg, that event was less owing to the martial qualities and skill of the besiegers, than to the unparalleled bad behaviour of the besieged, however the circumstances of those times might gloss the capture.

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These are some, but not the principal reasons, which led me, my Lord, to think the expedition to Virginia not entirely proportioned to its end, if that was to secure to us an advantageous termination to the disputes subsisting between the two crowns, and to stop the French progress on that continent. France from her extent, populousness, and the genius of her people, will be able to pour in ten men to our one, in support of her American pretensions and designs, if the war should last fifty years. In the plan of operations, the first expedient then, which naturally presents itself, is that of cutting off all communication between Old and New France; this the seizure of Quebec will only effect, and, at the same instant it will break the French force in Canada:—when the spring is diverted or cut off, the river must dry up. Such is the position of Quebec, that it is absolutely the key of French America, and our possession of it would for ever lock out every Frenchman, be the signal of revolt to the Indians, ever determined by success, and probably to a majority of the Canadian French, fond of liberty. Montreal must fall the same campaign, and Louisbourg, with every strong hold depending on them for subsistence, and all French Canada will necessarily follow their fate. Such is the happy situation of Quebec, or rather of Montreal, to which Quebec is the citadel, that, with the assistance of a few sluices, it would become the centre of communication between the Gulph of Mexico and Hudson's Bay, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by an interior navigation formed for drawing to itself the wealth and strength of the vast interjacent countries; the commerce of Europe, Africa, South America, and Asia, by a quick and easy exterior navigation, and advantageously placed, if not destined, to lay the foundation of the most potent and best connected empire that ever awed the world. Its utility to France will arise from a most rapid and independent commerce, well supplying the want or extinction of all other, since its territories from north to south do, or will with a little industry and ministerial address, produce whatever characterizes the growth and manufacture of every country. What most immediately imports us, is the monopoly

monopoly of furs, with their fabricature; and the vast fishery in and about the river of St. Lawrence, at once an inexhaustible mine of wealth, and seminary of hardy seamen. These advantages shew the perpetual and mighty resources which Canada alone, in the possession of France, will furnish, in constituting a naval power, to our most dangerous rival. A political necessity will determine this nation, and the insidious practices of France will frequently favour us with pretexts, to destroy, at intervals, their fleets, thereby to preserve our naval superiority, on which our all depends; for, however exalted be the bravery, or happy the conduct of our officers, a reverence for truth obliges me to say, that, in neither are the French inferior; their military knowledge is incomparably greater, and well exercised; and none, or few are the instances, where we have gained victory when the force was equal. But, my Lord, the temporary expedient of destroying their fleet, will be but the lopping off the Hydra's head, whilst the fishery of Canada, that noble nursery of seamen, those excellent harbours, particularly Quebec, the best circumstanced in the world for building and docking ships, those deep rivers, crowned with immense forests of excellent oaks and pines, flax plantations, the best iron mines, and every naval requisite for pouring out new fleets, remain in the dominion of France. What hinders now, but want of common sense or honesty, the French ministry from seducing and settling in Canada, (with recompences which, costing nothing, at once would enrich the country with inhabitants and their industry,) all the naval artificers of Europe, to construct with materials at hand, and costing nothing for ages to come, a most formidable fleet on every exigency, and from making a continued naval arsenal from Cape Breton to Montreal? Our seizure of Canada would then undeniably, by this destruction of the vital source of their rising naval power, and by an immense accession to our own, give us the monopoly of the fur and fishery trades, open to us so many new and vast channels of commerce as would take off our every possible manufacture, especially of woollen and linen, whilst it poured in every growth, and every

material at so cheap a rate as would make us necessarily the mart of foreign exportation, and most amply compensate for even the extinction of all our other foreign trade of importation; a circumstance, in such a situation to be wished, as it would reunite and fortify all our colonists, and the exclusive possession of that continent will fill each ocean with British shipping, without depopulating this country. Hence, my Lord, posterity will ever venerate Lord Bolingbroke's project of the conquest of Canada, as the wisest and most provident ever framed by British Ministers, and had the execution at home and abroad been entrusted to men of equal zeal, of sufficient spirit and abilities, its benefit to this nation could no more have been estimated, than its detriment to France, which, at this hour, would have been in no condition to injure or molest us. Hence, my Lord, I, with anxiety, saw and spoke, particularly to my Lord Northumberland, in November last, of the efforts against French usurpation, purposed to be made on the Ohio, where nothing decisive may happen, but the advantages and disadvantages may reciprocally fluctuate, as long as the pass of Quebec is open to pour in fresh supplies of French troops. The conjuncture seemed favourable, and French invasion afforded the pretext of making an offensive instead of a defensive war, the different effects of which on the minds of the soldiery are well known, as is the greater facility in conducting the former, and its more numerous advantages.

Such a war would probably have had an advantageous event, if, in the last autumn, the fleet of England had been manned for action, and the army sufficiently augmented to guard these kingdoms in all contingencies; if a strong squadron had blocked up or destroyed (if they had put to sea) the armament which it was easy to foresee the French would push to support their pretensions in America; if another squadron, with the transports, &c. all sheathed, by previous feint orders sent to the Windward Islands, and provision made there, apparently destined to seize the Neutral or French Islands, had sailed in the beginning of March with six or seven thousand old troops, with some brigades
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of foreign engineers, and munitions for sieges, and on opening at sea their sealed orders, had proceeded to besiege Quebec; if the independent companies and levies of the Southern Provinces of America, had, during winter, assembled at a proper post in Pennsylvania, formed magazines, levelled the roads, and made all apparent preparations for acting on the Ohio in the spring; if a corps of six thousand men had been raised and regimented under British Officers in New York and New England, and delusory measures taken for their joining the troops in Pennsylvania; if two or three hundred shipwrights had been sent to the fort on the lake Ontario, as a reinforcement of the garrison, but secretly to collect and build as many sloops and boats as possible; if a few Indian companies of irregulars, under their own officers, had been entertained to attend these two bodies; if the governor of New England, solely trusted with the secret, had privately collected provisions, munitions, &c. during winter, at Boston; and, in March, had transported two thousand of the new raised troops to Nova Scotia, under pretext of acting offensively there, but in reality to relieve the old regiments; if, in April, the governor of New York had assembled the militia, Indians, &c. at Albany, and made feigned dispositions for attacking Crown-Point; and at the same time the governor of New England had assembled the troops, &c. at Boston, embarked or marched them, as most convenient, the beginning of May, under pretext of attacking Chignecto, stopping, however, at the river Kennebeck, where the Nova Scotia old regiments should have joined them, and together have marched to Fort Halifax, entrenched strongly, and established their grand magazine; if the troops in Pennsylvania, whose early rendezvous and preparations would naturally have drawn most of the French troop from Quebec and Montreal, had begun to move in May, and after some feints, had suddenly, and by forced marches, filed off and seized the petty fort at Niagara, entrenched strongly, have seized immediately and built armed vessels, and scoured the lake Erie, whilst some provincial seamen had done the same on the lake Ontario, and kept open the communication between Niagara and the

the fort on the lake Ontario: this enterprize, well conducted, would necessarily cut off the retreat of the French at the Ohio, and moulder them away by famine and desertion. The different provisions and motions, feigned and real, made at Boston, New York, Pensylvania, and Nova Scotia, with other attentions dictated by a just knowledge of the country, and a proper use of the Indians, would conceal the real design, whilst they corresponded with its execution, and by drawing the attention of the French governor every where, incapacitate him from acting efficaciously any where. On the arrival of the fleet at Quebec, or in the middle of May, the troops should march from Fort Halifax, and join the forces in carrying on a vigorous siege. Quebec, necessarily reduced, and garrisoned with some New England and some old troops, the army should immediately proceed to Montreal, the reduction of which must necessarily be attended by the surrender of all other posts, as from the ~~two~~ former they draw their whole subsistence and munitions. The blow, my Lord, would have been bold but with these provisions, no less easy than decisive in our favor, and mortal to the French, and, in the rupture consequent to this stroke, the *coup de grace* be effectually given by a firm adherence to, and vigorous prosecution of a naval war in all seas, soon extirpating the French naval power and commerce, and exhausting and weakening, to a great degree, her natural wealth and strength.

France might probably act, as if she thought our weak part to lie on the European continent, and attempt to distress or divert us from the prosecution of our natural interest and use of our natural strength, by an attack on our allies. I presume not, my Lord, to know the nature or reason, or extent of our connections there; but it becomes a nation, as a private person, to be tenacious of its engagements, and these might probably be well answered by our money and the force of our fleets, so far as they could be useful. The Germanic body might not suffer, for its own sake, any of its members, or the Dutch to be long a spoil to the French: means might arise to make Prussia an acting friend; and probably

probably Spain be induced to co-operate with us, on the terms of covering with our fleet any body of troops sent to re-unite, which they are thought to have at heart, Hispaniola to their crown; an island of signal detriment to us in the hands of the industrious Frenchman, but of no consequence in the possession of the lazy Spaniard. The cession of the Neutral Islands, or whatever France might take in the West Indies or Mediterranean, would be an easy purchase for Canada. At all events, England has often taken glorious care of herself, when Scotland and Wales have been in the enemy's scale, and could do so again, maugre the efforts of France and all her allies; whatever their malice might be, their power to hurt would soon sink never to rise more, by the loss of Canada and the destruction of their shipping. Your Lordship may ask, why I mention not the Mississippi colony and inlet; perhaps it would be expedient to take no further notice of them now, than to prevent any considerable reinforcement from being sent thither, but not to seize them for two reasons; the first is, that no present umbrage might be given the Spaniard by so near a neighbourhood in the Mexican Gulph; the second is, that the few inhabitants who survive their migration thither, might be permitted to open, plant, and render healthful that country, and make it more worth capture, inevitable whenever we pleased, for the same reasons that the inhabitants of cold have ever and ever will conquer those of hot climates. A good fort or two at the junction of the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers, would be sufficient to stop the Mississippians from penetrating to the northward and north-westward.

An objection to a plan of this tendency may arise, my Lord, from the projects of independency, which a consciousness of growing strength, and the annihilation of French power, might give birth to, in our American colonies, and therefore a balance of power between the two people there, might be more advantageous to the two crowns; but besides the moral impossibility of fixing such an equality of power, by no means the aim or end of the French, an upright and steady government will always have due weight with the bulk of a people, whatever
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be the practices of some turbulent or ambitious spirits. The splitting of that empire into many distinct governments, the diversity of manners, customs, modes of religion, and interests too consequent to the difference of climates, provincial laws, products, and situation inland and maritime, will render a coalition of political views not easily practicable, but create jealousies, and an indifference, or rather balance, to each others projects. Twenty thousand regular troops, judiciously posted, and chiefly in the conquered provinces, would guard and command the whole country. These troops, maintained as levied at the expence of America, should be triennially relieved to prevent their acquisition of any natural interest there, and all considerable posts, civil, military and ecclesiastical, be invariably filled by persons of proportionate land property, in Great Britain and Ireland. Such, with other precautionary provisions, the command of the sea, and the physical dependence, at least for many ages, that continent, from its great inequalities of seasons, lakes, &c. must necessarily have on this kingdom for its woollen manufactures, would very solidly establish British dominion. Perhaps the erection of Canada into a kingdom for Prince Edward, would for ages answer that purpose, as well as be a greater, more rational and permanent accession of strength to this kingdom and its Royal Family, than the wearing of so many crowns by the House of Bourbon, in different parts of Europe, can possibly be to that family or to France.

But, supposing this independent spirit, in future times, to take place; the provinces will always be glad to receive, and this nation strong enough to impose, as their head, a younger son of the Royal Family; and certainly the union between two people of the same blood, religion, polity, language, laws, humour, and genius, under the same family, would be infinitely more strongly cemented and complicated than the union of states and kingdoms, dissimilar in almost each request, nursed in and distinguished by national prejudices, can be under the dominion or influence of the Bourbon or any other family, or the combination of any conjunctures can form.

But, my Lord, if the advantage will not allure, necessity ought, and
I have

I hope will impell us to conquer Canada; the pretensions of the French to that whole continent, though temporarily dissembled by their government, are constant and avowed by the people; and the hopes and aim of both invariably terminate in its reduction. Their own histories of New France are histories of continued schemes, plots, enterprizes, and machinations, ministerial and private, in peace and war, concerted for the accomplishment of this great event, and to facilitate which, perjuries, poisons, murders are, with them, lawful means. If Canada remains in the hands of the French, they will equally from the operation of their good and bad qualities, from the nature of things, arrive at this supreme sovereignty; and the English colonies experience the same fate which the Grecian colonies, on the coast of Asia, underwent from the grand monarch of Asia;—fall a prey to the grand monarch of American France: nor are the circumstances dissimilar, but in favour of the French, excepting numbers, which every day will improve. The very political independency of the provinces on each other, will quicken their dependence on the French, and the whole power and wealth of the continent become that of the foe, and be turned against Great Britain.

Your Lordship will readily conclude, that I am one of those who wish the late armament from Brest had not been permitted to fail, or to have been destroyed if they had failed; I fervently wished it; and shall be extremely happy if I am mistaken in my belief, that the arrival of that armament in Canada, will be eventually productive of great mischief, unless timely redressed by a furious attack of Quebec. Although that reinforcement, so much wanted there, and which the French, knowing their weak part, resolved to send at all hazards, will render its reduction more difficult; yet more troops, great address in the preparation, and great resolution in the execution, which a good General knows how to inspire, will surmount the difficulty. Whatever the capture costs of men and money, the expence of both will be small to that of a defensive war and precautionary provisions, which may have little intermission, and no end, until the French be formally and really masters of

that continent. The acquisition will be to us a temporary expence, instantly repaid by the fur trade and fishery; the benefit perpetual: but in the hands of the French, their American power will soon grow so strong, and take such an extended and deep root, to which a defensive war will not a little contribute, that it will prove the severest thorn in the sides of England, to extract which, millions in vain may hereafter be expended. I just beg leave to say a word of the navigation of the river St. Lawrence: it appears, through all the affected obscurity of the French voyage writers, and the horror which former miscarriages and ignorance has thrown on it, to be safe, though sometimes tedious; the mystery consists in timing the voyage and keeping the southern coast aboard, from Cape Rozier to Quebec, with due respect to some intervening shallows and islands.

If any suggestions of mine could contribute towards a system of operations for this or any other enterprize, your Lordship will always very heartily command me, as the country will my service; and, if any thing here said appears interesting, your Lordship will do me particular favor in communicating it to my Lord Hallifax, to whom I have not the honor of being known. Your Lordship will have the goodness to consider it as flowing from a heart fervently attached to the public service, and your favorable acceptance of it may hereafter induce me to lay before your Lordship a plan, which, in the course of some military essays occurred to me, for the establishment of a marine corps, whose service, in peace and war, might possibly give satisfaction to prince and people; certainly would be more useful than the marines now raising, who, I humbly apprehend, cannot in their present form be good soldiers, nor in any form good seamen, whatever to the contrary may be expected.

I am, my Lord, &c.

J. SIMCOE.

LORD BARRINGTON.

June 1st, 1755.

Trewmans, Printers, Exeter.